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16 The role of emotion in moral socialization 
Richard A. Dienstbier 
The major aim of this chapter is to discuss a research program designed to 
assess emotion-cognition-behavior relationships in moral decision making. 
While pursuing that aim, I will discuss the relationship of that research to 
some of the more enduring theoretical issues in emotion. 
Theories of emotion wax and wane across a more extended time frame than 
is typical for theoretical approaches in many other areas in psychology. Perhaps 
these extended cycles of emotion theory result from the relative difficulty in 
the recent past in doing definitive research within the area of human emotion. 
The field was thereby insulated from sudden shifts in focus precipitated by 
dramatic research relevant to basic theory. 
One of those areas of enduring concern to philosophers and psychologists 
interested in human emotion has been whether to conceive of emotion as 
dimensional versus discrete in structure. Those on the discrete side of this 
controversy generally trace their theoretical lineage to Charles Darwin, whereas 
dimensional theorists often credit William James. Discrete theorists hold that 
there are eight or nine basic emotions, which are inborn syndromes of feeling 
and behavior (e.g . , Izard, 197 1, 1977; Tomkins, 1963). Although proponents 
of that view would usually acknowledge that general physiological arousal 
(cerebral, autonomic and/or endocrine) may affect some dimension of intensity 
or duration of experienced emotion, the role of general arousal is regarded as 
minor. On the dimensional side of the debate, several modern theorists argue 
that the physiological arousal underlying emotional experience combines with 
certain cognitive assessments of the meaning of that arousal to form a specific 
emotional experience, so that the number of different emotions one could 
experience would be limited only by one's ability to be cognizant of nuances 
of meaning in a situation that had stimulated general arousal (e.g., Mandler, 
1975; Schachter & Singer, 1962). Similarly, the focus of the two approaches 
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is on different response categories, with discrete theorists showing interest in 
the face and facial expression or voluntary muscle patterns and the dimensional 
theorists focusing on sympathetic nervous system arousal and hormonal changes 
or upon states of general cortical arousal. (For a review contrasting dimensional 
and discrete approaches, see Izard, 1971 .) 
whatever the disposition of current theorists in this area, most acknowledge 
that for appropriate or inappropriate reasons, a major impetus toward the study 
of the interaction of emotion with cognition has been the attention given to 
the work of Schachter and Singer (1962), who attempted to support a radical 
dimensional viewpoint. The program of research reported in this chapter was 
stimulated by that dimensional work, now two decades old. Over the decade 
of this project, which is still ongoing, my students and I have had cause to 
modify our initial dimensional beliefs. Without dwelling on that personal 
progression, this chapter will discuss our theoretical evolution as our research 
developed. The final portion of the chapter will evaluate recent research designed 
to refute and to-support the radical dimensional view with which we started 
and to evaluate our research in view of those observations. 
A related theoretical concern is the interrelationship of emotion and cognition. 
Can emotion exist independently of cognition? While this is not a crucial issue 
for the discrete emotion theorists, for those who hold to strict post-Schachterian 
dimensional views, cognitions about the source and meaning of autonomic 
arousal are essential in the experience of emotion. "Pure" emotion without 
cognition is therefore not possible. (Such notions of the inseparability of emotion 
and cognition are consonant with the dominant view of attitude held during 
the 1950s and 1960s by most social psychologists.) Whereas the issue is some- 
times couched in terms of whether cognitions precede and stimulate emotional 
states (e. g., Beck's, 1967, cognitive theory of depression) or whether emotional 
arousal precedes and stimulates consonant cognitive activities (e . g . , various 
physiological approaches and pharmacological treatments of emotional dis- 
orders), Zajonc (1980) has recently refocused attention on the more basic 
question of whether emotion and cognition may exist independently of each 
other. The research revikwed in this chapter will be discussed in relation to 
this issue. 
Emotion defined 
Before discussing my research, let us consider establishing a definition of 
emotion. Each chapter author will undoubtedly confront this task differently, 
for differences in definition lie at the core of many theoretical disagreements. 
Like attempts to definitively establish the components of,personality , the question 
of emotion definition should, at our present state of knowledge, be approached 
by first ascertaining which theoretical or practical questions will be pursued 
once the definition is established. Extending George Kelly's notions about 
theory in personality into the realm of emotion, each theoretical approach and, 
to a certain extent, each definition implies a set of constructs that may be most 
usefully applied toward a limited "point of focus"; similarly, there exists a 
range of convenience for the theory beyond which other theoretical structures 
and definitions need be sought. 
Because of the nature of the research described in this chapter, my definition 
of emotion will stress aspects of motivation and arousal. Formally and simply 
put, human emotion is conceived to be a motivation-laden feeling resulting 
jointly from shifts in arousal and from the meaning attached to those arousal 
shifts. 
To understand this definition, consider first the nature of arousal. Some 
arousal may be central nervous system arousal, and some may be peripheral, 
depending upon the emotional state elicited; certain of the arousal components 
may be general and common to many emotional states, and others may be 
unique to specific emotional states. The generation of the aroused state usually 
results from perceptions of external situations; those perceptions, together 
with later cognitions about the meaning of the external state, influence the 
nature of the experienced emotion and the direction and force of the experienced 
motivation. 
Next, let us consider the motivational qualities of emotion. The motivational 
quality of the feeling of emotion is experienced as an increased tendency to 
avoid or pursue certain perceptual experiences (i.e., to attend to certain classes 
of stimuli), to remember and think about ideas and images with a similar 
affective tone, and to avoid or pursue certain behavioral options associated 
with changing our relationships with certain classes of goals (e.g., to fight 
with, run from, reject, avoid, or engage with). While following both Tomkins 
and Izard that the motivational quality of emotional experience is of paramount 
importance (e.g . , see Izard & Tomkins, 1966), for me even low intensities of 
human emotion frequently stimulate far more effort than would be expected. 
That is, we may respond to the motivational quality of even slight emotion 
and to cognitions about the likelihood of emotional states as if we were ex- 
periencing a strong, current, emotion-instigated motivational force. While I 
will return to this theme at the chapter's end, it is time to consider the theoretical 
system that initially led to our research. 
The development of modern peripheral-dimensional 
theory 
Throughout the 1950s studies by a group of psychologists at the University of 
Rochester investigating the effects of various popular illicit drugs stimulated 
interest in the interaction of physiological states and cognitive information on 
the experience of mood and emotion (Vincent Nowlis, private communication). 
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Those researchers (including G . R. Wendt , Vincent and Helen Nowlis , Russel 
Green, and others) found, for example, that the impact on mood of a given 
drug varied dramatically as a function of whether other research subjects were 
simultaneously exposed to the same or to a different drug (e.g., whether an 
individual stimulated by an amphetamine remained with others similarly treated 
or with individuals who had taken barbiturates). Following those demonstrations, 
Schachter and Singer (1962) similarly demonstrated that following adrenaline 
injectior), individuals appeared to act differently depending upon either the 
information they received through the social environment in which they were 
subsequently placed or through direct information about the impact of the 
adrenaline. Although the continuity between those two lines of research is 
easily apparent, the discontinuity is less obvious - whereas the drugs under 
study in .the Rochester experiments were thought largely to affect mood as a 
result of the alteration of central nervous system conditions, the adrenaline 
used in the Schachter and Singer (1962) study was thought to impact emotion 
through feedback from peripheral body areas. Similarly, when Schachter and 
Wheeler (1962) demonstrated the impact of chlorpromazine in reducing laughter 
in response to a humorous movie, the peripheral impact was emphasized. 
Those interpretations led to a dramatic modification of previous dimensional 
approaches, which had emphasized cerebral arousal (e.g . , Lindsley , 1970); 
instead, it was emphasized that feedback from peripheral areas and cognitive 
interpretations about the meaning of that feedback would be crucial in the 
experience of emotion. At the end of this chapter I will discuss research from 
other sources concerning the role of adrenaline (and noradrenaline) in the 
experience of emotion and those recently published studies that have challenged 
the Schachter and Singer findings and debated the role of autonomic (and 
facial) feedback in the experience of emotion. For the moment, the critical 
point concerning the early "emotion-attribution" interpretations by Schachter 
and his colleagues is that those interpretations stimulated a significant amount 
of research that could be (and was) interpreted as support for the importance 
of feedback from peripheral arousal in the experience of emotion and for the 
correctness of a dimensional approach with peripheral arousal as the central 
physiological dimension of importance. 
The role of emotion in moral decisions 
Schachter and Latank (1964) demonstrated that psychopathic criminals would 
learn to avoid punished errors much better if they were first aroused with an 
injection of adrenaline, and Schachter and Ono (reported in Schachter & LatanC, 
1964) demonstrated that college students tranquilized with chlorpromazine 
cheated more. Those demonstrations suggested that both the avoidance of 
punished errors and resistance to temptation were influenced by high levels 
of psychological arousal. Actually, it was inferred from that and other related 
research (which showed that psychopaths may be as physiologically reactive 
as nonpsychopaths) that the experience of inhibiting emotion, rather than 
physiological arousal per se, would reduce the probability of transgression. 
Misattribution of peripheral arousal symptoms and cheating - 
the jirst study 
Impressed by the coherence of those converging approaches to the role of 
emotion in resistance to temptation, and by the peripherally based dimensional 
theory of emotion, which underlay those approaches, I endeavored to ask the 
next logical question concerning the impact of peripheral arousal on resistance 
to temptation: Could it be demonstrated that one's interpretation of the meaning 
of the arousal modulated the effectiveness of that arousal in facilitating resistance 
to temptation? 
h sbett and Schachter (1966) had previously developed a technique that 
secmed to successfully influence the meaning of peripheral arousal and hence 
the experience of emotion. They had administered placebo pills with instructions 
that the pills would either contribute to four peripheral arousal symptoms 
(hand trembling, fast heart rate, face flushing, and stomach butterflies) or (for 
control subjects) would contribute to symptoms that were irrelevant to peripheral 
autonomic arousal. Those subjects who anticipated arousing side effects from 
their placebo pills subsequently withstood more electric shock (a graded series 
of mild shocks) before reaching the b i t  of their pain tolerance than did those 
subjects anticipating benign symptoms. It appeared that the misattribution of 
emotional arousal - stimulated by the electric shock and by fear of the shock 
- to the placebo pill lessened the avoidance-motivating quality of that emotional 
arousal. 
We anticipated that this logic would hold equally well for our research 
subjects as they faced the temptation to cheat. That is, when facing such 
temptation in a natural environment, individuals would experience some emo- 
tional arousal - arousal that would signal their fear, shame, or guilt in anticipation 
of either the act of or the consequences of cheating. Whereas such emotional 
responses would motivate the avoidance of cheating in a natural setting, we 
anticipated that we could lessen that effect if we could induce misattribution 
of theremotional experience to a previously consumed placebo pill. 
The first study with placebo pills in this series served as a prototype for the 
subsequent studies. Freshman introductory psychology students were recruited 
"in order to study the effects of a vitamin-related drug on vision." After being 
seated in individual booths, subjects were given a placebo and a form describing 
the pill's major effects on both vision and either the peripheral arousal side 
effects or the benign symptoms as described by Nisbett and Schachter. A 
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vocabulary test was subsequently given to fill the interval "while the pill took 
effect" but that vocabulary test was to be taken seriously, because the "board 
of psychologists" developing that test was supposedly interested in interviewing 
college freshmen with particularly poor vocabularies. Following that test, 
subjects were exposed to the autokinetic illusion to substantiate the "visual 
effects" cover story and subtly reminded of the possible side effects. Subjects 
were then given the opportunity to cheat on their vocabulary test. The period 
during which subjects could cheat on their vocabulary tests was introduced as 
a delay period before rating any possible side effects (arousal-relevant or 
benign). Subjects were shown the correct vocabulary-test answers and told to 
"clean up" their machine-graded answer papers if needed (to provide an excuse 
for using their pencils and erasers) but warned "do not change any answers." 
Virtually all subjects "failed" the vocabulary test, which was designed to be 
deceptively difficult. Following the 7-minute period during which subjects 
could cheat by changing vocabulary test answers, a detailed post-experimental 
questionnaire concerning any suspicions was administered, followed by a 
complete debriefing. 
With cheating defined as changing one or more answers, almost twice as 
many subjects anticipating arousal side effects from their placebos cheated 
(49% vs. 27%, p < .02). However, that effect was achieved almost entirely 
by the male subjects. (The procedure for detecting cheating using pressure- 
sensitive paper is described by Dienstbier & Munter, 1971 .) 
Before sex differences are discussed, let us consider some procedural questions 
and the meaning of the major findings. Did our suggestions about side effects 
lead to only the desired between-condition differences in the attribution of 
emotional arousal or were actual differences in arousal levels created between 
the experimental conditions? Once arousal-relevant side effects have been 
suggested to individuals in such research, there is no test free from very 
obvious demand characteristics, which could prove the null hypothesis that 
no arousal differences were actually created by direct suggestion. While we 
therefore have no definite answer to the question of between-condition arousal 
differences, we believe that such differences are unlikely, in part because of 
our technique for presenting side-effect information. We approached the in- 
duction of beliefs about placebo side effects in a low-key manner. That is, we 
suggested that we were not at all certain whether each individual would ex- 
perience side effects and indicated that our reason for requesting feedback 
from each subject on whether such effects were experienced was a reflection 
of our uncertainty that such effects would occur. As observers of the experimental 
situation, it was our impression that the side-effects suggestions were among 
the least interesting and stimulating of the experimental maneuvers that our 
subjects experienced. A major reason for keeping our side-effect manipulation 
relatively tentative was to avoid the incredulity that frequently follows from 
overemphasizing such impacts. A recent review and analysis by Ross and 
Olson (1 98 1) of both direct and "reverse" placebo effects substantiates these 
conclusions. 
Assuming then that we did not induce differential arousal levels in our two 
subject groups, we are left with an emotion-attribution explanation for the 
cheating difference: That the attribution of arousal to a cause or source that 
is not relevant to the moral decision (the placebo, for the subjects in the 
experimental conditions) would attenuate the impact of that arousal in resisting 
temptation. Being neither hard determinists nor strict behaviorists, we were 
not aloof from speculation about the rational processes that might have intervened 
between our independent manipulations and altered cheating rates. The ideas 
that we then posited (and which have been subsequently modified by being 
placed in a more extensive context) were that individuals who face temptation 
think about their behavioral alternatives and, depending upon factors ranging 
from past punishment for options currently considered to the perception that 
certain actions would lead to value conflicts, experience emotional responses. 
We believed that we had demonstrated that if the peripheral symptoms of 
emotional arousal are experienced as irrelevant to the temptation dilemma 
(i.e., attribution to the placebo), then the emotional state would not be ex- 
perienced as inhibitory - individuals would be as free to cheat is if they did 
not experience the emotions at all (as with the tranquilized students of the 
Schachter and Ono research described earlier). The research seemed to provide 
strong support for a dimensional emotion theory based upon peripheral feedback. 
More about that later. 
Cheating and arousal misattribution -follow-up studies 
Before we could progress with an understanding of the interaction of emotion 
and cognition in determining behavior in temptation situations, we had a con- 
ceptual cleanup chore required by the sex difference finding of our initial work; 
additionally, we wanted to be sure that an attributional explanation was necessary 
to account for our results rather than a simpler attentional one. (That is, would 
merely attending to the peripheral arousal side effects impact cheating or was 
the attribution of those symptoms to the placebo a necessary step.) With respect 
to the findings of sex differences, we reasoned that our female subjects may 
have been more upset by failing in the presence of the threat of the "board of 
psychologists" than were males. Subsequent research (Dienstbier, 1972) in- 
dicated that as threat intensity was systematically varied across four levels, 
at lower threat levels the placebo manipulation worked exactly as it had for 
males (with more cheating associated with the arousal side effects). Those 
results confirmed our suspicion that men and women use emotional cues similarly 
in making decisions about cheating and that the cause of our initial finding of 
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sex differences was probably that our women subjects were more distracted 
by an intense social threat than were the men. 
In a third study, using males, it was shown that when subjects focused 
attention on arousal-relevant (vs. benign) side effects it did not impact their 
cheating unless they could also attribute that arousal to a placebo. Half the 
subjects were given no pills at all but were instead told that they were a control 
condition to check for suggestion effects in a drug study. Thus they were to 
rate their (arousal or benign) side effects and do everything (except view the 
autokinetic illusion used to verify the effectiveness of the placebo) the "real" 
subjects did. Merely attending to whether they experienced the side effects 
had no impact on cheating, as contrasted to the replication (of Study 1) conditions 
where the arousal-condition subjects again cheated far more than did the controls. 
Apparently, the misattribution of emotional arousal to an irrelevant source is 
necessary before cheating rates increase. 
Related emotion-attribution research 
While our work progressed, other researchers were using similar independent 
manipulations to successfully test important variations of the peripheral di- 
mensional approach. All these studies investigated and confirmed hypotheses 
that arousal would contribute less to a variety of emotional states when such 
arousal was misattributed to sources believed to be irrelevant to emotion (such 
as a placebo pill or a background noise). Younger and Doob (1978) found, for 
example, that administration of an "arousal" placebo reduced aggressive re- 
sponse. Ross, Rodin, and Zimbardo (1 969) demonstrated that subjects who 
could attribute their arousal symptoms to a loud background noise worked less 
to avoid shocked punishment (contrasted with working to earn a positive reward) 
than did subjects who anticipated benign effects from the background noise; 
apparently the arousal from the anticipation of shock became attributed to the 
noise and hence was not experienced as fear. Rodin (1976) demonstrated that 
women who could attribute test anxiety to premenstrual symptomatology im- 
proved in test performance. 
Emotion misattribution and the extinction of conditioned 
responses 
Two related research programs were more directly important from the standpoint 
of our considerations of moral development. Loftis and Ross (1974) had subjects 
acquire a classically conditioned galvanic skin response to a light (having 
( previously paired the light with shock) while an irrelevant tone sounded in 
the background. Following conditioning, some subjects were told that the tone 
was really responsible for their emotional response; others were not given 
such erroneous information. Those who attributed their conditioning to the 
tone extinguished more quickly (in a light-alone condition) than did subjects 
not given that misattribution-facilitating information. Thus, although previous 
research demonstrated that arousal misattributed to an emotion-irrelevant source 
would lose its impact on emotional experience, the Loftis and Ross study 
suggests that such misattribution will also lead to the quick extinction of 
acquired emotional responses. 
P 
Emotion misattribution and reduced attitude change 
in dissonance research 
In a second research tradition, Zanna and Cooper (1974) showed arousal mis- 
attribution effects in the realm of dissonance research. In forced-compliance 
research, it is assumed that subjects induced to advocate attitudes that are 
quite different from their initial attitudes will experience some emotional tension. 
In turn, that tension will motivate attitude change, so that the subjects' attitudes 
shift in the direction of the position advocated. (Of course various parameters 
relevant to perceived coercion, payment, or lack of freedom attenuate this 
effect.) In a series of studies Zanna and Cooper demonstrated that postdissonance 
(following forced compliance) attitude change did dot occur when arousal 
resulted from cognitive dissonance that was either misattributed to an irrelevant 
source or was the consequence of ingesting a tranquilizer (phenobarbital; Cooper, 
Zanna, & Taves, 1978); on the other hand, when subjects anticipated relaxation 
symptoms from an irrelevant source (but did not receive them) or were stimulated 
by an arousing amphetamine drug, postdissonance attitude change increased. 
Since those studies used both misattribution techniques and arousal-impacting 
drugs, they provide a powerful confirmation of arousal-misattribution working 
somewhat as suggested above. That is, the misattribution of arousal to an 
irrelevant source attenuates the impact of that arousal on subsequent decisions 
in a manner directly analogous to that obtained with a tranquilizer. The relaxation 
symptoms provided converging evidence; the misattribution of relaxation 
symptoms to an emotion-irrelevant source lead to behavioral outcomes similar 
to those caused by the administration of a stimulant drug. It should be noted, 
however, that in the case of this research both the arousing and the tranquilizing 
drugs used actually affect the central nervous system rather than peripheral 
processes. This observation has implications for a peripheral-dimensional theory 
of emotion. This issue will be discussed later. 
Emotion misattribution and enhancement through the addition of 
naturally induced arousal 
Another paradigm that was interpreted as supporting emotion-attribution theory 
involves inducing arousal in more natural ways than the adrenaline-injection 
technique used by Schachter and Singer and studying changes in a situation- 
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appropriate emotional response. For example, Zillmann, Katcher , and Milavsky 
(1972) demonstrated that exercise-induced arousal facilitated aggression re- 
sponse; this facilitation was particularly strong (Zillmann, Johnson, & Day, 
1974) when individuals mistakenly thought that they had returned to base line 
in their exercise-induced arousal. Similarly, Cantor, Zillmann, and Bryant 
(1975) found that exercise-induced arousal facilitated the judgment of aesthetic 
value of objects and the entertainment value of an erotic film, but only when 
subjects mistakenly believed that they had recovered from the exercise-induced 
arousal. Arousal induced by listening to complex (versus simple) tones delivered 
at loud volume (rather than mild) was found to increase aggression (Konecni, 
1975). 
A number of different approaches placed individuals in the company of 
attractive opposite-sexed others subsequent to arousal. Dutton and Aron (1974) 
found that more TAT story sexuality was elicited in males following passage 
over an arousal-inducing suspension bridge as contrasted to men who met the 
beautiful experimenter via a less-arousing bridge. Similarly, I have noted 
(Dienstbier, 1979a) that while attraction toward a beautiful (or handsome) 
opposite-sexed researcher is enhanced by startle-induced arousal (relative to 
nonstartled controls), attraction toward a same-sexed experimenter is reduced 
by that arousal-inducing startle. 
With respect to the theoretical issue concerning a peripheral-dimensional 
theory, it should be apparent that the other placebo studies (including the Ross, 
Rodin, and Zimbardo study, 1969, in which arousal was attributed to sound) 
could be regarded as providing further supporting positive evidence. However, 
the conceptually similar second group of studies, in which naturally induced 
arousal apparently contributed to heightened emotional experience, could be 
more broadly interpreted. That is, while I have continued to use the term 
arousal, the operations inducing that arousal are not restricted to enhancing 
merely peripheral or autonomic arousal. Finally, as noted briefly earlier, the 
finding that central nervous system stimulants and tranquilizers lead to results 
similar to the misattribution of peripheral relaxation or arousal symptoms 
casts a pall over a radical peripheral-symptom dimensional emotion theory. 
This issue and the implications for theory will be reengaged later in this chapter. 
Emotion attribution in self-control with children 
Following the research with adult cheating, described earlier, I began to speculate 
with several colleagues and students about how normal socialization procedures 
with children might affect emotion-attribution processes in natural settings. 
Daryl Bem's work (1972), following that of the more traditional attribution 
theorists (such as Heider, 1959), had suggested that one reflected upon one's 
own previous behavior and searched for explanations of that behavior from 
among the possible internal motives and environmental forces. (Note here the 
similarity of that view to the traditional emotion-attribution view, which posits 
that following arousal one begins a search for explanations for the development 
of the arousal; both views have been challenged for their "cart before the 
horse" appearance.) These views were incorporated into thinking about the 
socialization of morality and self-control. Aronson and Carlsmith (1963) and 
Lepper and his colleagues (e.g., Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973) had dem- 
onstrated that whenever more force was used by a socialization agent than was 
needed to influence a desirable choice by a child, the child would attribute 
subsequent positive behavior to those external forces; no reduction in attraction 
toward the negative behavioral option would be experienced. On the other 
hand, if less pressure was applied to the child and especially if the child 
experienced some personal choice in adopting the positive behavior pattern, 
then the child would seek to justify his or her choice and, to achieve that 
justification, would value more the "chosen" positive behavior and devalue 
the "unchosen" negative option. 
In our view, "overjustification" theory offered a substantial improvement 
over more traditional social learning conceptions of moral development, giving 
a clear prediction for the improved effectiveness of reduced coercion in so- 
cialization. (For an excellent recent review of attributional vs. social learning 
approaches to moral socialization, see Perry & Perry, in press.) 
The major issue we took with the traditional attribution approach was simply 
that emotion had been left out of the process; we felt that the inclusion of 
consideration of attributions about emotion offered an important addition to 
the cool rational thinking proposed by the overjustification theorists (Dienstbier 
et al., 1975). Most traditional thinking about major moral socialization problems, 
from the development of psychopathy on the one hand to issues of oversocial- 
ization on the other had highlighted the central role of emotional processes. 
Indeed, the work just reviewed on cheating and emotion misattribution and 
the work of Schachter and Ono with chlorpromazine suggested to us that even 
in adulthood emotional processes were central in moral choices. We believed 
that they would be at least as important in childhood moral choices. In this 
regard the importance of emotional or affective processes in making judgments 
(as contrasted to "cool" cognition) parallels the recent thinking of Zajonc 
(1980), who has emphasized that when the balance between cool cognition 
and affect is assessed, "for most decisions, it is extremely difficult to demonstrate 
that there has actually been any prior cognitive processes whatsoever." Emotion 
plays a role of similar magnitude in our model. 
As an illustration of emotion-attribution processes developing during a so- 
cialization encounter, consider two children confronting angry parents over 
some proscribed behavior. The confrontation and uncertainty would normally 
lead the children to experience a significant level of emotional arousal. If one 
of the children was subsequently physically punished, that child could arrive 
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at quite different conclusions concerning the meaning (and cause) of continuing 
negative emotional states than would the child who was not given so salient 
a stimulus as physical punishment. Assuming some learning (similar to classical 
conditioning) of emotional responses following confrontation and/or punishment, 
it is likely that in subsequent temptation situations of a similar nature that the 
previously punished child would experience more emotional arousal than the 
child given an explanation of why such behavior was wrong. (See Hoffman, 
1970, for an extensive discussion of "induction" techniques.) But emotional 
intensity may not be as crucial as the meaning of the emotional response. If 
the children were sure that detection of transgression was impossible, depending 
upon which of those previous treatments were received, the meaning of the 
emotional response would vary. The previously punished child might attribute 
arousal to the previous episodes of salient punishment, and, as in the experiment 
with an arousal-generating (placebo) pill, that emotional response would be 
assessed as irrelevant to the current detection-proof temptation dilemma. Having 
not experienced salient punishment in previous episodes, so that no alternative 
external explanation for emotional tension is available, the second child could 
believe that his or her tension is caused by the temptation to misbehave rather 
than to previous negative parental responses. 
Early self-control studies 
We attempted to abstract the emotion-attribution aspects of these socialization 
episodes into a laboratory procedure. Since that procedure is discussed exten- 
sively elsewhere (Dienstbier et al., 1975), it will be sketched here. 
To effect as powerful a design as possible, identical or same-sex fraternal 
twins were used as research subjects. While the magnitude of the between- 
condition means are not affected by these special subjects, the use of such 
subjects allows the control of genetic and social background in a matched- 
pairs design. Individual subjects were left alone in a toy room with the assignment 
of watching a problematic slotcar (an electric toy car guided by a pin that 
slides through a slot in the track) in order to prevent an accident that could 
seriously affect the (very old) slotcar. After subjects abandoned their assigned 
task for a criterion time period, the accident was made to happen (by a hidden 
observer) and the experimenter was simultaneously signaled to return to the 
playroom. Subjects in the condition hereafter called internal (in which emotion- 
attribution was made relevant by association with the child's own behavior) 
were informed that they might feel unhappy because of what they had done 
and that children who do the right thing usually feel good even if no one else 
ever knows of that proper behavior. Subjects in the external condition (emotion- 
attribution to confrontation) were informed they might feel a bit bad because 
the experimenter knew what they had done and that children who can show 
others that they have done the right thing usually feel good. The emotional 
intensity of the two manipulations was carefully matched. The temptation 
situation was subsequently structured so that children believed that their watching 
of the slotcar was important but that now (with a new slotcar, the door locked 
from the inside, and with training in restarting the slotcar in case of accident) 
no detection by the experimenter of either good or poor behavior was possible. 
Twins in the internal condition (emotion attributed to own behavior) transgressed 
(failed to watch the slotcar) for an average of 177 sec out of 12 min, contrasted 
with 322 sec for their external-condition co-twins (p < .001). In a similar 
study with nontwins, transgression rates were 80 sec and 187 sec (p C .07), 
respectively. (The power of the twin design is seen in that whereas only 12 
twins contributed to the first analysis, 24 subjects participated in the similar 
but marginally significant results of the nontwin study.) Subsequent research 
found almost identical results when the initial failure of the child was replaced 
by a story about another child who had "tried to help us out" but who had 
failed to watch the slotcar sufficiently to prevent the dreaded accident. The 
independent manipulation was couched in terms of how and why that other 
child responded emotionally to that failure. 
Collectively, the research with twins and nontwins indicated that when a 
situation is perceived to be detection-free, emotional responses attributed to 
relevant sources (such as own behavior) play a large positive role in resistance 
to temptation, as contrasted to emotion attributions to irrelevant sources (such 
as previous confrontation). If these manipulations truly abstract important 
elements from real-life socialization episodes, they illustrate some of the reasons 
why more gentle and psychologically oriented socialization techniques may 
be more effective than harsh and punishment-oriented practices. 
Integration of child and adult studies and theoretical 
reconceptualizations 
Whereas the studies with placebo pills and cheating had at best only slight 
mundane realism, it being fairly unusual for one to ingest symptom-stimulating 
placebos prior to confrontation with moral dilemmas, the work with children 
provided a closer approximation to real life. We concluded that gentler so- 
cialization approaches have the dual virtues of being less likely to become the 
focus of emotion attribution and of providing a vehicle for specifically directing 
emotion attributions to the child's previous transgression. 
Although at this point in our research most of our thinking was about the 
negative emotional response an individual would have while facing transgression, 
it was suggested by others (particularly Jerzy Karalowski, personal commu- 
nication, 1978) that we should similarly focus upon the role of emotion attribution 
of positive emotions in prosocial choice situations. That is, if positive emotional 
responses are attributed to one's own choice to engage in altruistic behavior, 
then the likelihood of future similar altruistic behavior (in an anonymous 
situation) should be high relative to another person who believes that such 
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positive feelings stem from recognition from others for one's positive accom- 
plishments. In a variation on this thinking, Hoffman (1977) has discussed the 
efficacy of explaining to children how they impact upon the emotional states 
of those with whom they interact. The focus is not upon attributions about 
one's own emotional states but upon attributions about the other's states (e.g., 
"she will feel bad if you take that away from her"). Finally, similar approaches 
are used by Weiner (Chapter 6, this volume) in thinking about the emotional 
response of individuals to achievement situations. 
The mundane realism of our independent manipulation and its application 
to children had been more than merely improved. The languge derived from 
the peripheral-dimensional approach to emotion had been replaced by language 
that simply discussed "feeling good" or "feeling bad" with no reference to 
specific symptoms of arousal or to peripheral or central locations of feelings. 
We wondered whether our peripheral-symptom messages of the college-student 
cheating research could have been replaced by far simpler messages about the 
experience of emotion resulting from the pill. 
Adult cheating, schema activation, and emotion 
attribution 
Although a complete answer is not available to that question, a partial one 
was provided by some subsequent research.. We launched a series of experiments 
in which our independent manipulations were presented to adults in the guise 
of reading-comprehension tests, with cheating on the vocabulary test the de- 
pendent measure (Dienstbier et al., 1980). Fortunately for our understanding 
of the interaction of emotion and cognition in temptation circumstances, our 
initial studies seemed to be complete failures; people who were sensitized to 
moral issues through their reading-comprehension test cheated more (on the 
vocabulary test) than did control-condition subjects who read nothing relevant 
to emotion or morality. We assumed that Study 1 was an example of the 
haunting reality that false positive results (or, as in this research, false negative) 
will strike once in 20 successful experiments when probability levels are set 
at p < .05. When, to our deep chagrin, we replicated the phenomenon (Study 
2), we were forced to grow in our understanding of the interaction of emotion 
and cognition. 
The intent of the five studies in this series was initially to ascertain whether 
a manipulation very much like that used with the children would similarly 
affect college students who were tempted to cheat. But whereas the children 
were presented with manipulations that directly addressed their future (dependent 
measure) behavior, in forms such as "you will feel bad if you do a poor job 
watching the slotcar, even if no one ever knows," adults were presented with 
messages in abstract form that were not directly related to the dependent- 
measure task. Passages were presented as reading-comprehension tests, which 
described the interaction of emotion and cognition in temptation situations 
using either internal or external emotion-attribution terms; a control group 
read about perception rather than morality. For example, in Study 2, the internal- 
condition subjects read that emotional tension develops when one contemplates 
or executes actions that are counter to one's own moral values. External- 
condition subjects read a matched passage that presented the idea that emotional 
tension signals that the contemplated or executed transgression is behavior 
that would have resulted in punishment in childhood, even though the real 
danger of punishment may no longer exist. The two messages we hoped to 
transmit to our subjects were that emotional tension experienced in the face 
of temptation is usually relevant to that decision (internal) or likely to be 
irrelevant to the decision (external). As in previous research, subjects were 
told that the "board of psychologists'' developing the verbal tests was particularly 
interested in vocabulary test performance and would be interested in following 
the future grades and career of individuals who scored unusually low (defined 
as less than 18 of the 30 vocabulary items correct). When manipulation checks 
indicated that our subjects did not really understand the distinctions between 
internal and external manipulations, we knew that differences in cheating 
between the internal and external conditions would not be great; indeed they 
were not; but in Study 2, where control subjects read about long- and short- 
term memory, the finding of least cheating in the control group did replicate 
a similar finding from Study 1. (In both studies, 18% [14] of the 77 control- 
condition subjects cheated, as contrasted with 36% [51] of the 143 subjects 
in the combined internal and external conditions, p < .01.) 
To explain our peculiar results, we began to speculate about the potentially 
elaborate roles of moral schemas in determining responses to temptation 
(Dienstbier et al., 1980); we temporarily suspended our thinking about emotion 
attribution. We defined a "schema" as a complex of values, attitudes, cognitions, 
and emotional responses that are either spontaneously made salient by internal 
thought processes or elicited by new relevant information; the interaction of 
new information with the elicited schema determines the resultant attributions, 
decisions, and behaviors. 
We were sure that we had sensitized our subjects to moral issues by our 
internal and external emotion-attribution messages, since those manipulations 
contained detailed reference to various moral choices and how emotion plays 
a role in aiding people in the avoidance of lying, cheating, and stealing. Since 
those manipulations increased subsequent cheating on the vocabulary test, we 
reasoned that some other aspects of our experimental situation were providing 
information that interacted with heightened sensitivity to moral issues to increase 
cheating. We decided that the threat of embarrassment by an anonymous and 
powerful "board of psychologists" in the context of what should have been 
a simple one-hour experiment may have seemed unfair, particularly to those 
of our subjects who were stimulated to dwell on what is and is not moral; 
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potentially increased resentment could then have accounted for our peculiar 
results. 
To test that hypothesis, we attempted to reduce such resentment in Study 3. 
We modified Study 3 to replicate Study 2 but with the research represented as 
the dissertation research of a graduate student (who acted as the experimenter 
in both studies). In addition, after the warning not to change any answers, the 
experimenter added that for his dissertation he needed accurate data or he 
might have to spend an extra semester gathering new data. As hypothesized, 
whereas few subjects in the internal and external conditions cheated, more 
subjects in the control condition did cheat (12% vs. 29%, p < .05). To be 
certain of our interpretation, we followed in Study 4 with a quasi-experiment 
in which both the Study 2 and 3 versions of the procedure were run, but with 
the experiment stopped just at the beginning of the period during which subjects 
could cheat. Questionnaire replies made at that moment indicated that the 
hypothesized resentment differences could account for the increase in cheating 
in Studies 1 and 2 in the moral schema activation conditions (internal and 
external) and a decrease in cheating in those conditions in Study 3. 
Having apparently solved the problem of our initially surprising results, in 
Study 5 we carefully designed an internal and external emotion attribution 
manipulation with understandable and salient between-condition differences 
contrasted with a (long- and short-term memory) control condition for the last 
time. The hypothesized reduced cheating in only the internal emotion-attribution 
condition was achieved (with 15% cheating, differing from both the external 
condition rate of 30% and the control condition rate of 3 1 %, p < .05). 
As had been hoped at the inception of this series of five studies, the final 
study formed a conceptual bridge between the initial adult cheating studies, 
which employed the placebo-pill/misattribution manipulation, and the studies 
with children in which the misattribution information was provided at a con- 
ceptual level in a language that might be used in real socialization episodes. 
Additionally, this final study employed a significant methodological improvement 
over the work with children, for the independent manipulation was not related 
by the experimenter to the dependent-measure task. That is, in the work with 
children one salient alternative explanation for our results had haunted us: 
That the two emotion-attribution messages, by referring to the dependent- 
measure task ("you will feel bad if you don't watch the slotcar"), may have 
somehow increased the importance of that task in the internal condition relative 
to the external condition. This study achieved a conceptually similar result 
while effectively eliminating that alternative explanation. 
The interaction of emotion attribution and schema activation 
Following the research series just described, we concluded that whereas moral 
schema activation will enhance resistance to temptation (as in Study 3, given 
that no other information in the situation in interaction with the schema results 
in contrary analyses of what is moral), those increases in moral behavior will 
most likely occur when the appropriate emotion attributions are made. That 
is, in the external emotion attribution condition of Study 5 the elicitation of 
the relevant moral schema with an irrelevant emotion attribution resulted in 
no reduction in cheating (contrasted to the control group). Although a single 
study is far from definitive, those results, in combination with the placebo 
study results, allow the strong inference that, even for college-age adults, 
appropriate attributions about emotional tension in the face of temptation may 
be essential in determining the outcome of decision making when behavioral 
choices present a moral value conflict. 
In the original presentation of the five studies we speculated about the inter- 
actions of emotion-attribution processes and schema activation in temptation 
situations; the following roughly parallels that speculation: 
When an individual perceives the possibility of transgressing, schemas relevant 
to morality will typically become activated. In addition, emotional arousal 
will develop as a result of many processes, of which the following are examples: 
1 .  Arousal may result from elements in the current temptation situation being 
perceived as like previous elements to which emotional responses have been 
conditioned (as through previous punishment for transgression in similar cir- 
cumstances). 
2. If aspects of the moral schema relate to self-concept ("I should be honest"), 
the consideration of behaviors that are contrary to those self-concepts may 
elicit emotional responses. In short, potential value conflicts from contemplating 
transgression may cause emotional arousal. 
3 .  On the more external side, the individual may fear the potential shame or 
humiliation from others' knowing of the consideration, or the act, of 
transgression. 
Even though the emotional tension in a single situation may have been 
elicited by several causes, the meaning of the emotional experience will be 
determined largely by the most salient cognitions about the meaning of the 
arousal. Those cognitions depend in turn on the nature of the schema elicited 
in interaction with elements in the current situation. Anxiety, fear, guilt, 
shame, or even excitement could result. As shown by the placebo-pill research 
and by Study 5 of the last series, the amount of arousal and the attributions 
made about its source and meaning will determine its impact on behavior in 
the temptation situation. 
In addition, although this point is not illustrated by our research, it seems 
likely that the amount of emotional arousal elicited by elements of the immediate 
temptation situation would affect the degree to which the moral schema becomes 
salient and the specific components of the schema that are seen as relevant. 
We are left with a complex interaction between elements of the situation 
that are salient and important because of relevance to either current or past 
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socialization experience, the activation of some aspects of the moral schema 
by those elements, and the activation of emotional arousal by those elements. 
All these variables may have simple and interactive influences on all others; 
for example, both the initial intensity of the emotional response and the initial 
attributions concerning its source and meaning may influence, in turn, the 
search for either other relevant elements in the situation or aspects of the moral 
schema that bear on this situation. Out of this dramatic complexity one clear 
prediction remains: The meaning eventually accorded to the emotional experience 
in the temptation situation will play a major role in subsequent behavior. 
Relating this research to dissonance and extinction research 
It is useful to consider this model in the light of the similar work of Zanna 
and Cooper (1974) concerning the role of emotional tension in dissonance. 
They demonstrated that emotional arousal mediates attitude change when cog- 
nitions about attitude and about past behavior are dissonant unless that emotional 
arousal is misattributed to an irrelevant source. In our research, potentially 
similar dissonance was faced by our subjects before their behavioral decision. 
The "dissonance" centers around some aspect of the moral schema and the 
conflicting temptation to behave in a manner discrepant with that schema. As 
long as the resultant emotional arousal is experienced before the transgression, 
the emotional tension usually will be more easily resolved by resisting the 
behavior rather than by changing the moral schema. However, as with the 
dissonance research, where attributions of emotional arousal to an irrelevant 
source allow the dissonant elements to coexist without attitude change, emotion 
misattribution to irrelevant elements in the face of temptation apparently allows 
both the transgression and the contradictory moral schema to coexist. 
But the coexistence of transgression and contradictory moral schemas will 
not be maintained indefinitely in the context of emotional tension thought to 
be irrelevant. The findings of Loftis and Ross (1974) suggested that the post- 
conditioning misattribution of emotional tension to an irrelevant source leads 
to the more rapid extinction of the conditioned emotional response. In moral 
dilemma situations, the repeated attribution to fear of punishment (when pun- 
ishment is perceived as impossible) should lead to at least partial elimination 
of tension in the face of similar future temptations. 
Further research on self-control with children 
Our research program with children has led to some recent failures, which we 
hope will prove to be as heuristic as our initial "failures" in the adult series 
just described. That is, we have used a procedure similar to that used with 
children just described, but have attempted to present emotion-attribution 
messages in a form that does not relate directly to the temptation task in which 
they will be engaged. We have been telling stories of temptation successfully 
or unsuccessfully resisted, with the emotional response of the hero following 
success or failure and the emotion-attribution messages emphasized (e.g., "he 
felt very bad that he did not do what he was supposed to, even though no one 
ever found out" as an internal message and, as an external message, "she felt 
very good that her mother and father knew what a good job she had done"). 
To apply these messages to their own subsequent temptation, children must 
translate them into abstract terms (we supply some help in this initial transition) 
and apply them to the specific concrete situation in which they find themselves. 
Children in grades two through seven have not been successful in doing this, 
as no between-condition behavior differences have yet been demonstrated in 
that research. However, some recent research by Rachel Karnoil (personal 
communication) has led us to speculate about the potential source of our prob- 
lems. Karnoil has demonstrated that the degree of post-transgression guilt 
experienced by children (as assessed in fantasy projection) does not relate to 
their actual resistance to temptation. She makes a strong and convincing case 
that for young children there is not necessarily any relationship between post- 
transgression emotions and emotional states experienced as inhibitory during 
or prior to the contemplation of transgression. Although she did not measure 
post-transgression guilt in response to exactly the same behavior as the sub- 
sequent temptation, this research does suggest that the automatic transition 
from post-transgression arousal, induced initially by confrontation with so- 
cialization figures, to inhibiting arousal may be later in development than I 
had previously believed. These ideas suggest that the most effective emotion- 
attribution messages for parents to give in the context of confrontation over 
transgression might involve describing the future feelings of children in similar 
temptation situations in addition to labeling current emotional feelings. 
A developmental perspective 
In this section, I will discuss in a more speculative form how the changing 
patterns of socialization of parents and the maturing symbolic capacity of the 
child lead to changing patterns of emotional intensity and attributions as the 
child develops. 
With very young children, the learning of prohibitions against injuring younger 
siblings or animals is often an important concern. In such socialization en- 
counters, the sheer intensity of the emotional response evoked by confrontation 
with parents over transgression is crucial. That is, when the child with very 
rudimentary symbolic capacity confronts a similar future "temptation," the 
sheer volume of inhibiting emotional reaction in contrast to the positive desire 
(as in a classic approach-avoidance conflict from animal research) determines 
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the outcome. As the child develops, just as the learning of language allows a 
cognitive symbolization of environmental (and behavioral) objects and events, 
a parallel symbolization of emotional response develops. That is, instead of 
the older child relying on the sheer intensity of inhibiting emotion to resist 
temptation, the symbolic representation of the transgression can lead to a 
similarly symbolic (or token) level of emotional arousal. At this point in 
development, even though the "approach gradient" toward a "sin of com- 
mission" may be very high, the child can understand the token inhibitory 
emotional response as a of sign the intensity of emotional response that would 
develop if the transgression were to be actually undertaken (andlor if detection 
were to result). Just as the purely cognitive representation of a delayed goal 
may allow the older child to delay immediate gratification (even without vis- 
ualizing and reexperiencing all the wonders of the greater but delayed goal), 
the symbolism of small levels of emotional arousal allows the resistance of 
even mighty temptations without reexperiencing the horrors of a fully developed 
negative emotional response (depending upon the attributions made, as discussed 
in the earlier part of the chapter). No longer dependent upon the reactions of 
parents, the experienced levels of emotional tension are usually sufficiently 
small so that they are neither "aversive" as they develop nor particularly 
"reinforcing" as they decline but instead serve only to forecast symbolically 
the aversive emotional response that might develop with transgression. 
Given that I am now invoking very small levels of emotional arousal, which 
may be experienced as shame (given external attributions) or as guilt (given 
internal attributions), would it not be more parsimonious and reasonable to 
abandon the emotion-as-symbol approach entirehy in favor of verbal symbolic 
processes within the developing child? That question is quite close to the one 
with which I began this research program, hardly believing that people of 
college age would rely upon either token or large emotional responses in 
making judgments about such behaviors as cheating. Yet the research has 
provided an answer (as has the research of Schachter and Ono, who increased 
cheating rates through the tranquilizer chlorpromazine; reported in Schachter 
& LatanC, 1964). Particularly for the placebo-pill research, it is difficult to 
pose an appealing alternative interpretation to the observation that emotion 
and emotion attributions play a major role. 
The role of socialization intensity 
Whereas in the foregoing sections of this chapter I considered the role of the 
type or quality of socialization procedure used in shaping the emotion attributions 
that developing children would make in the face of temptation, the intensity 
or quantity of socialization may also impact such attributions. Those forces 
impact the normal child's developing attributions in a way that may reinforce 
internal emotion attributions for intensely socialized dilemmas but stimulate 
external emotion attributions for temptations that have been weakly socialized. 
In this section, intense or strong socialization refers to pressures from social- 
ization agents that are neither more nor less internal or external in their focus 
than less rigorous or intense socialization but nevertheless evoke substantially 
more intense and enduring emotional responses. 
Remember the logic of self-perception theory. The individual makes an 
analysis of those factors that apparently influenced his or her own behavior - 
an analysis based upon the same observations available to the onlooker. In 
my extension of that approach to emotional events, I propose that the emotional 
state itself will be attributed to internal causes when it is experienced for an 
extended period of time in the absence of obvious external causes. Consider 
the child who has been strongly socialized for episodes of lying. Following 
an apparently undetected subsequent lie, the child may experience an extended 
negative emotional response. The high intensity and long duration of the emo- 
tional response should motivate continued searches for understanding. But if 
no punishment or other salient external element is present in this episode, it 
is likely that the child may come to believe that the extended emotional response 
is due to internal causes - his or her revulsion for telling the lie.' On the other 
hand, when the child is weakly and infrequently socialized for a specific class 
of transgression, the emotional response subsequent to an episode of transgres- 
sion in that category will be weak and uncertain. The failure of a significant 
emotional response when the child is "getting away with it" provides further 
evidence to the child that the proper attribution for any emotional response in 
like episodes (when parents may have intervened) was indeed external. This 
approach would predict that many of the weakly taught moral lessons of our 
youth should be soon forgotten (because of the quick extinction of emotional 
responses with external attribution, as discussed above), but that the strong 
ones should go with us to the grave. 
The role of temperament 
This same logic leads to the view that individuals with different temperaments 
should similarly gravitate toward different emotion-attributional styles. That 
is, for the child who easily experiences high levels of emotional tension, a 
kind of attributional inevitability may foster internal attributions about 
transgression-inhibiting emotion, even in the absence of socialization agents 
specifically fostering such internal attribution. Such a child would experience 
his or her intense and lingering emotional tension following transgression as 
a result of his or her own sins, so that such individuals should frequently be 
guilt-ridden. The vast clinical literature on depression is, of course, supportive 
of this conclusion, since many chronically depressed individuals indicate high 
frequencies of guilt-laden thoughts .2  
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On the other hand, the child with only a slight tendency to experience any 
negative emotional responses will "condition" poorly even in the face of 
strong socialization practices and will often inspire harsh and repressive measures 
from parents. Such harsh punishment provides salient external stimuli to which 
the emotional responses may be attributed. But the failure of a significant 
emotional response to develop when the child is "getting away with it" provides 
further evidence to the child that the proper attribution for the emotional 
response in other episodes (when the socialization agent intervened) was indeed 
to the external cause. Thus, whereas the easily conditioned child may form 
increasingly internal emotion attributions, the unperturbable child may form 
increasingly external attributions, even in response to similar socialization 
techniques. 
This logic would predict a population distribution of morality that would 
differ from the traditional bell-shaped curve. That is, with intensity of emotional 
experience and attributional tendencies not being additive but interactive, so 
that anxious individuals adopt internal emotion attributions and unperturbable 
people become external, a flattened curve, or even a trichotomous distribution, 
would be predicted, with (in the case of the trichotomous result) a major 
"bell" in the middle and two upturns on either end that would designate 
individuals who are either guilt-ridden, anxious, and depressed or psychopathic .' 
Physiological dispositions and personality 
If the foregoing speculations about the relationship of temperament to moral 
decision making have merit, there should be some research support. In fact, 
no research has been completed directly linking a tendency to form internal 
attributions about emotion in moral decision making with any aspect of tem- 
perament or personality. In the preceding section, I suggested that those with 
a more emotionally responsive temperament would become more internal. If 
we can assume that being more internal in emotion attributions (within the 
normal range) leads to the perception by others that one is better socially 
adjusted (by virtue of demonstrating appropriate levels of self-control), then 
indirect support for the basic relationship would be achieved by demonstrating 
a link between high emotional responsivity and positive social adjustment. 
Relevant to this issue of psychological responsivity and positive personality 
(or adjustment) characteristics, three branches of research do exist. One branch 
of that research, undertaken largely in Europe, indicates that within individuals, 
increases in the catecholamines adrenaline and noradrenaline in the context 
of challenge or stress are correlated with many positive characteristics of 
temperament and personality. The second branch of relevant research dem- 
onstrates relationships between the physiological responsivity of the sympathetic 
nervous system and positive personality characteristics. Finally, work with 
psychopathic individuals suggests similar relationships. 
Concerning the first branch of this research, high catecholamine levels during 
stress or high catecholaine level increases from control conditions to stress 
conditions have been associated with: high "ego strength" or greater "adaptive 
capacity or stress tolerance" in American male college students (Roessler, 
Burch, & Mefferd, 1967); low neuroticism and low experience of day-to-day 
stress for Swedish male college students (Forsman, 1980); more trust, less 
apprehension, and less anxiety (measured on Cattell's Sixteen Personality 
Factors Inventory) for Finnish male high school students, and low psychosomatic 
symptomatology for both male and female Finnish high school students (Rauste- 
von Wright, von Wright, & Frankenhaeuser, 1981); better ratings by teachers 
of social adjustment and emotional stability and more school satisfaction for 
12-year-old Swedish girls and boys (Johansson, Frankenhaeuser, & Magnusson, 
1973). Finally, in contrast to the substantial catecholamine increases of normal 
criminals as they experienced the approach of their trial dates, psychopathic 
criminals showed no such catecholamine increases (Frankenhaeuser, 1979). 
The literature just cited is not an exhaustive review of the research showing 
positive relationships between catecholamine increases in stress or challenge 
and positive personality characteristics. Although it is compatible with major 
approaches to undersocialization and psychopathy to assume that catecholamine 
deficits may be associated with those states, finding that such deficits may be 
associated with anxiety and other forms of maladjustment is not as easily 
incorporated into most existing theories. However, to ease that problem, Jo- 
hansson and Frankenhaeuser (1973) found that whereas improved performance 
accompanied catecholamine increases, neuroticism was identified with slow 
recovery (return to catecholamine base line) following stimulation. 
Investigators of the second branch of research linking arousal indexes to 
temperament, who are largely American, have measured direct indices of the 
activity of the sympathetic branch of the autonomic nervous system and have 
come to similar conclusions about arousal and positive personality dimensions 
and/or socialization. J. Schachter and his associates (1965) found that for a 
sample of 46 college males, intimacy and involvement (a trait correlating .61 
with tolerance for anxiety) was positively correlated with both heart-rate var- 
iability and skin-conductance levels under stress. They concluded that those 
subjects with calm temperaments showed the highest physiological reactivity 
to stress. Valins (1967) found similar results. The most important study for 
our purposes was that of Waid (1976), who found that skin-conductance re- 
sponses to both signaled and unsignaled noxious stimuli were positively cor- 
related with level of socialization as measured by the California Personality 
Inventory. 
Concerning the third branch of research linking arousal to temperament, 
physiological response patterns have been related to psychopathy by Mednick 
(1977). Mednick was primarily interested in high-rate offenders and those 
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diagnosed as psychopathic (in Denmark where extensive records are maintained, 
allowing this type of research). To assess autonomic activity recovery, Mednick 
focused on the electrodermal response and the speed of recovery from that 
response (EDRec). Having measured autonomic characteristics in a large pop- 
ulation of Copenhagen males in a longitudinal study, Mednick noted that the 
EDRec was slower in those 36 men who subsequently violated the penal code 
and slowest of all for those 9 individuals who were diagnosed as psychopathic. 
Mednick also noted a high heritability component for EDRec, with the children 
of criminal fathers showing a pattern significantly like their criminal fathers 
(contrasted to noncriminal fathers and their children). (Similarly, the number 
of skin-conductance responses was almost double for the children of the non- 
criminals, indicating more orienting responses to the cues presented.) In studying 
maximum-security prisoners identified as psychopathic, Hare (cited in Mednick, 
1977) has found similar correlations of EDRec and psychopathy. 
Taken together, the three lines of research suggest the conclusion we had 
been looking for: That indices of increased physiological responsivity , suggesting 
greater ease in the learning of emotional responses, are positively related to 
positive personality dimensions and to level of socialization. 
A return to basic issues in emotion theory 
Let us return to the question of a dimensional theory of emotion emphasizing 
peripheral visceral feedback. Although the initial research using placebos sug- 
gested support for the peripheral feedback version of a dimensional theory of 
emotion, the independent manipulation in the research with children, which 
discussed "feeling good" or "feeling bad," allowed other interpretations. 
Subsequently, the final series of studies presented internal and external ma- 
nipulations to college students in a textual format that described "emotional 
tension" rather than specific peripheral symptoms. The positive results of 
Study 5 in that series indicated that emotion attribution to an external source 
(previous punishment) facilitated cheating; that finding suggests strongly that 
the peripheral-dimensional language of the initial placebo studies was not 
essential. Of course, if that peripheral-symptom language was not essential 
in the early placebo cheating studies of our series, it probably was similarly 
nonessential in all the other noise-attribution and pill-attribution studies that 
appeared to support the peripheral-dimensional view. I now suspect that upon 
being told that peripheral arousal symptoms may be increased by a placebo, 
the research subject associated those systems (of muscle tension, pounding 
heart, face feeling flushed, and stomach "butterflies") with tension and/or 
anxiety and then understood the message to be that feelings of emotional 
tension would be pill-induced. Given this interpretation, I suspect it would 
have been as effective a technique for inducing emotion misattribution to have 
suggested symptoms relevant to muscle tension in facial areas ("you may 
begin to experience feelings of tension in your brow and jaw"). The findings 
in the dissonance literature, cited earlier, that a central tranquilizer was similar 
in effect to misattribution of "peripheral" arousal symptoms and that the 
misattribution of peripheral relaxation symptoms achieved effects similar to 
a central stimulant support this line of reasoning. Together, these observations 
suggest modifications oftemotion-attribution theory away from the "classic" 
notion that one's understanding of the causes of one's peripheral arousal symp- 
toms determines the quality of the emotion experienced. I would suggest instead 
that one's ideas about the source and meaning of one's emotional experience 
determine (to some extent, with caveats to be elaborated) the quality of that 
experience and the impact of that experience on behavior. 
Necessary modifications to peripheral-dimensional theory have been prompted 
by recent experimental efforts that have identified increasing emotional arousal 
with more negative than neutral emotional tone (i.e., Marshall & Zimbardo, 
1979; Maslach, 1979). Although those data suggest that one should not assume 
that an emotional state is merely "standard" undifferentiated arousal with a 
specific cognitive label, some of the research cited earlier shows that arousal 
induced by startle, exercise, and acrophobia can contribute to increased attraction 
toward others, increased sexuality in stories, and so on. These data strongly 
suggest that negative rather than neutral undifferentiated arousal can still con- 
tribute to a positive emotion if the environmental elements fostering that at- 
tribution are strong and salient. That is, in the context of those strong envi- 
ronmental cues, prior arousal from the sources described leads to increases 
on the dependent measure dimensions to a greater extent than if no prior 
arousal has been established. Elements within the individual similarly foster 
or inhibit such an emotional attribution. (For a detailed discussion of the 
parameters affecting emotion attribution, see Dienstbier, 1979b.) 
Concerning studies favoring the facial-feedback hypothesis, usually attributed 
to discrete emotion theorists, several studies that bear on the issue have recently 
appeared. While Torangeau and Ellsworth (1979) were unable to show any 
impact of feedback from facial expressions when their subjects held a facial 
expression for an extended time period, Zuckerman and his colleagues (1981) 
found strong evidence that both the experience of emotion and vagous peripheral 
autonomic arousal indexes increased when subjects exaggerated their facial 
responses (in response to short films), as contrasted with either neutral in- 
structions or instructions to minimize facial responses. Similarly, Laird and 
his associates (1982) have found that cognitions are influenced by facial 
expressions in the direction of emotional tone compatible with the expression 
assumed. 
As I have discussed more extensively elsewhere (Dienstbier, 1979b), it is 
apparent that there are components of arousal similarity between the various 
Role of emotion in moral socialization 509 
emotional states characterized generally by sympathetic nervous system arousal, 
just as there are obviously components that are different (such as facial expres- 
sion). Whether one focuses on the similarities and works with questions best 
answered from a theoretical stance, which emphasizes those similarities (such 
as has been my research approach), or whether one focuses on the differences 
and emphasizes compatible research and theoretical positions, the "opposing" 
theoretical position is not even addressed. I would suggest, however, that just 
as Laird and Crosby (1974) have suggested that individual differences may 
exist in sensitivity to facial feedback, similar between-individual differences 
probably exist for responsivity to more general forms of arousal. 
Similarly, although no convincing data exist (to my knowledge) on this 
point, I strongly suspect that the degree to which facial or autonomic feedback 
plays a relatively larger role in the experience of emotion depends upon which 
emotional state we focus upon. Working within the framework of discrete 
theories for a moment, if one focuses upon the probable origins of certain 
emotional states in terms of the major adaptive functions they evolved to 
serve, some strong hints as to likely sites of important feedback emerge. (See 
Scott, 1980, or Plutchik, 1962, for theories emphasizing the adaptive utility 
of emotional states.) For example, I would expect that feedback from the 
region of the mouth, throat, and esophagus would be extremely important in 
the experience of disgust (thought to relate originally to the rejection of tainted 
food), whereas the importance of genital feedback in advanced states of sexual 
arousal (certainly more appropriately thought of as an emotion than a traditional 
"drive," since it is evoked more by external stimuli than by internal physiological 
needs) seems obvious. 
On the other hand, the emotional states with which I have been most concerned 
in thinking about the inhibition of temptation are quite different. Anxiety is 
thought to arise in circumstances where neither a clearly definable cause nor 
an obvious response are available; predictably, the facial response is not generally 
emphasized, in contrast to the sympathetic and hormonal arousal character of 
anxiety. From an adaptive standpoint, this balance makes good sense, as the 
organism that feels vaguely uneasy has nothing to combat, nor an obvious 
direction available in which to flee, nor specifics about which to communicate 
with others of its kind. But an increase in general arousal, probably supported 
by long-term hormonal responses, will facilitate the long-term vigilance that 
may be necessary for safety and, in the context of a developed culture, the 
avoidance of temptation. 
This research program has not specifically addressed the issue of arousal 
balance between cortical, peripheral autonomic and peripheral muscular facial 
locations. Despite our inability to know with precision what specific events 
in our brains and bodies contribute to our experiences of anxiety, fear, shame, 
and guilt, it is apparent that such emotional states profoundly influence our 
behavior in temptation situations and that those emotional states and their 
impact on behavior greatly depend upon the attributions made about their 
meaning and origin. 
Summary 
Following an introduction of some modem theoretical issues in the area of 
emotion and the development of peripheral-dimensional theory and research, 
a brief review of literature is presented showing the impact of the intensity of 
emotional arousal on moral decision making. Several studies are then presented 
that were designed to demonstrate that one's interpretation of the meaning of 
emotional arousal moderates the effectiveness of the arousal in facilitating 
resistance to temptation. Using a paradigm in which emotional symptoms were 
misattributed to a placebo pill (or not, in the control group), it was shown that 
cheating on a vocabulary test was significantly increased by the misattribution 
to the pill of symptoms of peripheral arousal. 
Following another brief review of related emotion-attribution research based 
upon hypotheses derived from a peripheral-dimensional approach to emotion, 
some conflicts are highlighted in what seems at first to be a smooth progression 
of support for the peripheral-dimensional approach. 
Presented next is a series of studies on self-control with children, in which 
the experience of emotion (feeling good or bad) was attributed to "internal" 
(the child's own behavior) or to "external" (others knowing about the child's 
behavior) causes. The attribution of emotional experience to internal causes 
was shown to have powerful self-control facilitating effects on difficult watching 
assignments in "detection-proof " situations. Those findings are discussed in 
relation to the larger literature on moral socialization. 
A third research series is then presented that demonstrates that adult cheating 
rates too may be affected by giving adults different explanations of the meaning 
of emotional experiences in moral decision making. In the context of a reading- 
comprehension test, when adults read that the tension experienced during 
temptation is a sign that one may be about to violate one's own values, they 
cheated less on a subsequent vocabulary test than if they had read that emotional 
tension during temptation is related to past (often currently irrelevant) pun- 
ishment. We concluded that, as with self-control in children, the meaning 
adults attribute to their emotional response (not peripheral-arousal symptoms) 
is crucial in self-control. This section concludes with a discussion of the 
interaction of moral schemas and emotion-attribution processes during moral 
decision making. 
The role of emotion in resistance to temptation is then discussed from a 
developmental perspective. Explanations are advanced for how the progression 
from more intense emotional responses in younger children to the more symbolic 
and mild representations of emotional states in adults may still result in emotion- 
Role of emotion in moral socialization 51  1 
mediated self-control. Approaches to socialization that facilitate a more internal 
basis for conscience are discussed, and the role of inherited temperament 
differences in fostering internal and external emotion-attribution dispositions 
is discussed. Subsequently, some evidence from the research of others concerning 
the possible link between temperament and internality is presented and discussed. 
Finally, the broad theoretical issues concerning the nature of emotion with 
which the chapter began are reengaged in light of the evidence from our research. 
The state of the evidence concerning the importance of arousal feedback from 
different body areas is discussed, and conclusions are discussed concerning 
the relative merit of dimensional and discrete approaches to emotion. 
Notes 
1 The research of Zillmann and his colleagues has suggested a similar process for exercise- 
induced arousal. When subjects mistakenly believed that they had recovered from that lingering 
arousal, they misattributed it to such "internal" sources as their valuing of aesthetic stimuli, 
the entertainment value they perceived in a film, and their own anger (Zillmann et al., 1974; 
Cantor et al., 1975). 
2 It should be noted that this represents a causal emphasis between emotion and cognition in 
depression that is opposite to that popularized by Beck (1967). I am suggesting that the ongoing 
emotional state of depression can cause an increased frequency of emotion-compatible cognitions 
and that guilt (rather than shame), as an emotion compatible with internal emotion attributions, 
is a natural product of a lingering negative emotional state. Although this view is compatible 
with recent work on the impact of emotion and memory (e.g., Bower, 1981; Laird et al., 1982), 
it is not offered as a replacement for the causal direction emphasized by Beck but as an addition 
to that opposite causal view. 
3 With respect to this prediction of psychopathic behavior, it should be noted that several recent 
studies of crime (e.g., Mednick, 1977; Yochelson & Samnow, 1976) have concluded that most 
crimes in civilized societies are committed by a very small number of individuals, representing 
1% or 2% of the total population. 
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